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Introduction 
Formal state institutions like the political and legal order consist of rules that 
are formally codified and enforced by organizations with coercive power, while 
informal social institutions refer to the unwritten norms which are enforced 
outside the officially sanctioned channels. The research on social capital and its 
impact on the working of a political and legal order focuses on the relations 
between these two types of institutions. It has one basic message: for a political 
and legal order to work well and sustainably it is not only dependent on a 
smartly crafted institutional design with a well-constructed system of incen-
tives, formal controls and coercive mechanisms; at least as important are the 
supporting social institutions and informal norms which motivate and encour-
age citizens to cooperate with each other individually and collectively and to 
contribute voluntarily to the thriving of their political order and its institu-
tions and organs.  
This research has provided evidence that well-functioning interpersonal re-
lations and widespread social networks in the private contexts of a vibrant civil 
society are necessary foundations for the development of essential social virtues 
such as the capacity to create new relationships (“sociability”), the readiness to 
participate actively in societal affairs, the commitment to support political and 
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legal institutions and to contribute one’s share to those public goods which 
cannot be provided by formal institutions.1 
“Trust” is a key factor in this context. Only if people trust each other will 
they be ready to cooperate with their fellow-citizens, to do business with them 
even when transactions involve risks or work together in a collective enterprise 
to create common goods in their mutual interest. Only if citizens trust their 
politicians and civil servants will they support them in their ruling and admin-
istrating duties and follow their orders and decisions willingly. And only if 
politicians and civil servants trust their citizens in turn will they be ready to 
rule by argument and persuasion rather than by control and sanctions.  
The lesson social capital theory teaches us is that the formation and distri-
bution of these different variants of trust are rooted in the informal social insti-
tutions and culture of a society and cannot be created artificially by political 
fiat. But we must be aware of the fact that the “codes of trust” in a society can 
vary greatly and that it makes a huge difference if people restrict their relation-
ships of trust to a well-defined group with a clear demarcation towards outsid-
ers or if they are also ready to place trust in people who are connected with 
them only by “weak ties”. 
We will start with a short recapitulation of the arguments in favour of the 
relevance of trust and social virtues for the working of a political and legal 
order and why the social capital of a society is a main factor in the production 
of such attitudes and virtues. We then explain why it is of central importance 
to distinguish between different variants of social capital and to be aware of a 
“black” and a “white list” of social capital. On the basis of a differentiated pic-
ture of the relation between formal state institutions and informal social insti-
tutions, we will discuss and illustrate the topic with the example of Chinese 
economic history over the last 40 years – and conclude with some general re-
marks. 
  
                                                     
1 See Banfield (1958); Putnam (1993); Putnam (2000); Putnam (2001); Baurmann 
(1999); Baurmann (2000); Baurmann (2002); Baurmann (2006); Baurmann (2008); 
Ostrom/Ahn (2003). 
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Economising on Virtue or Taking Virtue Seriously? 
Trustworthiness and virtuousness are valuable and possibly also scarce goods. 
It is therefore expedient to be sparing with them. This principle of “economis-
ing on virtue”2 not only applies to the relationship between single individuals 
but, as the Scottish moral philosophers have taught us, should also be a guide-
line for the creation of societal and political institutions. The market serves as a 
paradigmatic example of an arena where the participants’ virtues and morals 
are largely dispensable, and yet where the result of their actions serves every-
one’s interest and, thereby, the public welfare. Institutions of this kind relieve 
individuals of the burden of moral duties and reduce the need for social norms 
as well as for investments to enforce them. 
The classical authors of the Scottish Enlightenment were optimistic that 
this principle could also be transferred to political institutions. Even within 
the difficult realm of state power, it seemed possible to invent institutions 
through which an “invisible hand” would aggregate the general pursuit of 
individual interests to a common good.3 This prospect was particularly attrac-
tive as one could discard the – possibly futile – Platonic task of controlling the 
personal ambition of state rulers by instructing them in virtuousness and mo-
rality. If, instead, there were ways of shaping the institutional framework of 
political action so that it would be to the rulers’ own advantage to take care of 
their subjects and the common weal, then trust in politics would become in-
dependent of trust in the character of the politicians. 
The hope of being able to rely on the “morality” of the political institutions 
rather than on the morality of the politicians still plays a prominent role in 
modern political science and social theory and, moreover, in public opinion 
too. Especially the modern democratic state with its institutionalized possibil-
ity of voting politicians out of office, its protection of basic rights, and its in-
genious system of the separation of powers and “checks and balances” seems to 
be the perfect example of a system which by means of cleverly constructed 
mechanisms prevents state rulers from misusing their power for their own 
private aims. 
                                                     
2 See Brennan/Hamlin (1995). 
3 See Hirschman (2013). 
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In recent years, however, the insight has grown among social theorists that 
the principle of “economising on virtue” has its limits and that we cannot solve 
all the problems of social and political order by well-designed institutions and 
their incentives.4 The functioning of a well-ordered political and legal system 
is, to a large extent, not only dependent on the behaviour of politicians or civil 
servants acting directly under the rules of state institutions, but also on the 
attitudes and the spontaneous behaviour of the citizens outside formal institu-
tions. Many social scientists today believe that because of this a well-ordered 
society and its political institutions must be rooted in genuine social virtues 
and trustworthiness of its members which cannot be traced back to rational 
opportunistic behaviour under some artificially created extrinsic incentives.5  
However, there can be no doubt that formal state institutions and the in-
centives they create matter and that different institutions will produce differ-
ent outcomes. Institutional rules influence the behaviour of actors inside and 
outside the institutions. But the effects of institutional design are dependent 
not only on the properties of the formal institutions themselves. Every state 
institution is embedded in an environment of informal social institutions and 
the overall impact of a state institution is not the result of an endogenous equi-
librium produced only by the incentives of this institution and the given pref-
erences of the actors. This impact is always a result of an equilibrium which 
emerges from the characteristics of the formal institution and exogenous forces 
and conditions. So the same institutional system can have very different out-
comes depending on the social context in which it is implemented. The “rules 
of the game” always include more than deliberately created rules of formal 
institutions. “Design principles” for formal institutions are clearly relevant for 
institutional stability and performance – but their exact consequences are not 
context-independent.6 
Emphasizing that social virtues are important for making a political order 
work is therefore not tantamount to assuming that political and legal institu-
tions and their design are irrelevant. To some degree the opposite is true: social 
virtues do not make formal institutions superfluous, but can serve as a basis for 
                                                     
4 See Baurmann (2000). 
5 See Putnam (1993), (2000); Fukuyama (1995a); Pettit (1997); Brennan/Hamlin 
(2000); Dekker/Uslaner (2001). 
6 See Ostrom (1990), Ostrom (2005). 
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making these institutions even more successful. We can reach more efficient 
equilibria by institutional devices if we can rely on the trustworthiness and 
intrinsic motivation of the actors: it becomes easier to create and change formal 
institutions, the demand for hierarchy and control in institutions decreases, the 
tension between formal und social institutional processes diminishes, institu-
tional norms and rules are more readily followed and the commitment to col-
lective decisions under institutional rules increases. 
If the outlined thesis is right, the working of a well-ordered society de-
mands a stable equilibrium between proper institutional design and a suitable 
social environment in which supporting social virtues play a central role. Polit-
ical and legal institutions can bring about a lot of things – but whether they 
do so in a desirable way is greatly influenced by factors outside these institu-
tions themselves. The efficiency of state institutions, their stability, their legit-
imacy and conformity to their norms and rules can only be realized if they are 
properly implanted in their social soil. It is true that societies can be changed 
and shaped with the help of state institutions, but how successful this is and 
what kinds of institutions are necessary cannot be answered in general terms. 
We cannot simply replace the moral fabric of a society and its spontaneous 
forces by the incentives of a cleverly designed institutional framework. The 
working of a society cannot only be based on extrinsically motivated compli-
ance with formal rules but also requires an intrinsically entrenched commit-
ment to fundamental social norms: we have to take virtue seriously! 
Bowling Together: Making Democracy Work 
The view that social virtues are essential prerequisites of a good society and a 
legitimate political order has a long history. The same is true of a family of 
theories about the factors which promote the desired virtues of citizens. These 
theories, which go back to Aristotle, were ingeniously renewed in Tocque-
ville’s analysis of democracy in America and in our time have been put in the 
context of social philosophy by the communitarians.7 In the last twenty years, 
however, a new and promising variant of these theories has been developed by 
the political scientist Robert Putnam in his pioneering books Making Democ-
racy Work (1993) and Bowling Alone (2000) which initiated a large number 
                                                     
7 See MacIntyre (2007); Etzioni (1993). 
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of theoretical and empirical studies on the social and cultural fundaments of a 
well-functioning society. 
In a nutshell, these theories share the assumption that social virtues are the 
product of a particular sort of interpersonal relationship between the members 
of a society. According to this assumption these civic relationships outside the 
state domain constitute a special area of a “civil society” whose dynamics are 
rooted in the aspirations and values of the citizens as private actors. As partici-
pants in this kind of private relationship, people will develop capacities and 
behavioural dispositions which promote their general sociability and coopera-
tiveness and which are therefore beneficial to the society as a whole and will 
spill over into the public sphere.  
To Aristotle this function is fulfilled by friendships which motivate indi-
viduals to behave altruistically towards each other and to jointly promote the 
values of their community. Tocqueville extended Aristotle’s view to include all 
personal relationships which are part of a collective enterprise that people pri-
vately and voluntarily initiate to realize a common aim. From his observations 
he draws the conclusion that by taking part in such associational groups, indi-
viduals will overcome short-sighted egoism and will learn to cooperate, to 
contribute to collective goods, trust each other, and peacefully solve issues of 
common interest. For Tocqueville the concrete aims, sizes and structures of 
associational groups are secondary. Whether they are established to build a 
bridge for a village, to come together to pray or to collect money for a hospital, 
they will all have beneficial influences on the behaviour and character of their 
members by turning them into persons who feel responsible for their fellow-
citizens and the common welfare.  
Whereas the communitarians in some respect go back to Aristotle in em-
phasizing the importance of common values, uniform convictions and shared 
traditions as the basis of social virtues, the modern theories in the political and 
social sciences are more in the spirit of Tocqueville focussing as they do on the 
variety and diversity of associational activities. They have coined the term 
“social capital” to summarize the different forms of association which can be 
produced through the private initiative of the citizens. The exponents of social 
capital theory believe that there are manifold kinds of social relationships 
which – although maybe to different degrees – have the capacity to create 
those special bonds between their participants which promote the development 
of social virtues: from the weak ties of loose social networks in neighbour-
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hoods, from bowling and bird-watching, soccer-clubs and bible-circles to po-
litical parties, NGOs and spontaneous social movements.  
According to this view, well entrenched interpersonal relations and widely 
spread social networks are not only important to provide individuals with ac-
cess to different kinds of valuable resources.8 Being embedded in stable social 
institutions should also teach the virtues of sociability and the general capacity 
to create and maintain reciprocal and cooperative relationships, to participate 
in common tasks and adhere to the principles of fairness. Without being able 
to overcome the free-rider problem, to act successfully as a collective and feel 
committed to the rules of a group, most joint enterprises would not get off the 
ground. Acting in social networks should moreover foster friendly and altruis-
tic personal relationships and thus a general emotional commitment. The 
norms and rules in networks would honour and sanction personal trustworthi-
ness thereby laying the ground for mutual trust in a society.9  
The crucial premise of social capital theory is, however, that there is indeed 
a spill-over, a transfer from the context of the social institutions of privately 
organized associational life to the society as a whole. But if individuals in a 
small village learn to behave fairly towards other village members, if they feel 
an emotional commitment to them and prove themselves to be trustworthy 
neighbours, will they consequently also be fair, altruistic and trustworthy as 
citizens of a large society? The exact mechanisms by which membership in 
associations of civil society leads to a high level of general sociability and wide-
ly spread trust are not yet clearly understood. We must gain more insight into 
which forms and elements of private associations and networks promote the 
desirable transfer and which do not. Of course, there is undeniable empirical 
evidence that there are important differences between various forms of social 
capital in this respect and that not every joint activity is conducive to society 
and its institutions as a whole.  
  
                                                     
8 See Coleman (1988); Granovetter (1973), Granovetter (1985). 
9 See Gambetta (1988); Misztal (1996); Fukuyama (1995a). 
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Making Democracy Worse: the Dark Side of Social Capital  
Timothy McVeigh and his co-conspirators in the Oklahoma City bombing 
were members of a bowling league: they were not, unfortunately, “bowling 
alone”. Osama Bin Laden was not acting as an isolated mad man, but was firm-
ly embedded in a well-functioning network of internationally acting terrorists. 
The so-called Islamic State is not held together by its imitation of state insti-
tutions but is based on the unfortunately quite effective social institutions of a 
deviant community. These extreme examples make clear that successful coop-
eration to achieve a common aim, or solidarity in a group of like-minded peo-
ple who may also be emotionally committed and develop stable trust relation-
ships is not automatically desirable for people outside the group or the politi-
cal order of a society. The collective good for the group could be a public bad 
for the community. Even when we think of less dramatic possibilities than in 
the Oklahoma City bombing or in the case of Al Quaida, differential mobiliza-
tion of the population by ethnic, racial, religious, or other ascriptive criteria 
can lead to very particularistic demands and will undermine rather than sup-
port a society as a whole.10 A rich network of associational activities and stable 
social institutions alone are no guarantee of a flourishing society and stable 
state institutions. They can be both a source of trust and a source of distrust. 
Instead of promoting sociability and cooperative capacities, they can produce 
insurmountable conflicts by shaping and organizing antagonistic interests and 
locking them in an inextricable equilibrium of continuous power struggle and 
mutual hostility.  
Putnam claims as a central result of his studies in Italy that the malfunc-
tions of state institutions in Southern Italy were chiefly a consequence of a low 
level of social capital.11 To generalize this correlation would be misleading. It 
is not the case that poorly performing societies with defective state institutions 
always display a low level of social capital. The stability of autocratic and des-
potic regimes often has two faces: on the one side there may be a fragmented 
civil society in which more or less isolated individuals live within weak social 
networks and must endure an underdeveloped associational life – a situation 
which is often the intentional outcome of a political strategy of the rulers who 
                                                     
10 See Hardin (1995). 
11 See Putnam (1993). 
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want to prevent the emergence of a strong civil society. But on the other side 
the members of the ruling oligarchy themselves may be integrated in a social 
and political network which guarantees a sufficient degree of mutual trust and 
reciprocity inside the political elite to enable the efficient realization of their 
collective goods. On this basis the commitment among them can be strong 
enough to overcome short-term opportunistic and selfish behaviour and 
achieve beneficial cooperation – which does not exclude the fact that the aim of 
this cooperation is to suppress and exploit the rest of the society. This also 
applies to the notorious example of the Mafia: Mafia is a form of social capital 
as it embodies a highly efficient social network, creates strong norms of honour 
and reciprocity, and successfully overcomes collective action problems of all.12 
High levels of social capital can also be a difficult obstacle in the transition-
al phase from traditional societies to modern democracies. Afghanistan and 
Albania, for example, are not societies with an especially low level of social 
capital. In both societies there are at least partially well-functioning social 
networks, relations of emotional commitment, trust and reciprocity, and the 
capacity for collective action embodied in traditional structures of families, 
kinship, clans, and tribes – all of them embedded in a highly respected social 
and religious tradition which contains values and norms with a considerable 
degree of legitimacy. The problem here is clearly not a problem of lacking 
social capital – the problem is the lack of the right kind of social capital. Social 
capital of a traditional sort may be very efficient in promoting cooperation and 
trust in certain groups, but at the same time it can be also very efficient in 
preventing cooperation and trust outside these groups. It is a long-held and 
quite common opinion that China provides another example of a kind of social 
capital that bars the way to progress by privileging only closed and traditional 
communities and thereby preventing the development of a modern market 
economy. We will come back to this prejudice soon. 
We have to acknowledge that social capital can have a dark, even sinister 
side.13 Networks, reciprocity, trust, emotional commitment and altruistic 
behaviour are good only in the right context. Indeed, some of the communities 
that have been able to educate their members successfully to behave unselfishly 
                                                     
12 See Gambetta (1993). 
13 See Hardin (1995); Levi (1996); Portes/Landolt (1996); Adler/Kwon (2000). 
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and to sacrifice their individual interests to the common cause are responsible 
for the largest catastrophes in the history of mankind.  
But also less dramatic excesses prove that well-developed forms of social 
capital could make a political order and societal life worse instead of making it 
work. Nepotism, corruption, rent-seeking, or partisanship are all forms of 
behaviour which are detrimental and destructive to a society. And they are all 
forms of behaviour which are, as a rule, more successful if carried out in a 
group as a collective enterprise than as an individual effort (see Baurmann 
2005). Not surprisingly we find that empirically all manner of social capital is 
built around those activities – ranging from loose networks which bring a few 
people together for a short period of time, to small associations with horizontal 
relations between members connected by trust and reciprocity, up to large 
organisations with formal rules and a strict hierarchy. The more developed and 
the more efficient those forms of social capital are, the worse for outsiders and 
for society as a whole. 
The dark side of social capital is not always connected with obviously con-
demnable behaviour such as trying to bribe or seek rents at public expense. 
Negative externalities whereby social capital is used to facilitate collusion 
among a group can also be generated when particularistic demands are put 
forward which cannot always be judged as morally wrong at the outset. Mobi-
lization of people to realize their religious visions or to promote the interests of 
their race or ethnicity can be rooted in moral convictions and personal virtues 
and can create social capital in a paradigmatic form. Groups and associations 
like these will often embody dense social networks, high levels of personal 
trust, altruistically driven reciprocity and generosity, and a strong intrinsic 
motivation to make sacrifices for the common good.  
These forms of social capital will, nevertheless, more often subvert rather 
than strengthen a society. The reason for this is obvious: associations like these 
are not “bridging” and “outward-orientated”, but centred around people of the 
same kind or origin and promoting goods which are exclusively valuable to the 
members of the group. The more successful these associations are, the less their 
members will have the incentive to cooperate and bargain with other groups 
on a common basis, but will see the chance to enforce their particularistic in-
terests at the expense of others. Thus social capital in this variant erects barri-
ers of mistrust between people instead of uniting them and contributes to aims 
and goods which can very easily conflict with the aims and goods of the society 
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as a whole. Associational groups of this kind will trigger a vicious circle be-
cause they undermine shared interests in a society and thereby create incentives 
for other groups – who, by themselves, would have no genuine reason to devel-
op in this way – to concentrate exclusively on their members and their particu-
laristic interests as well. 
Social networks, emotional commitment and trust alone are therefore not 
sufficient for a desirable spill-over effect beyond group boundaries. Social capi-
tal can also have a dark side as it can embody networks which are not bridges 
bringing different kinds of people together to promote joint interests, but 
instruments of separation erecting borders and barriers, and providing an ex-
clusive resource to a special group. Instead of encouraging reciprocal and 
trustworthy behaviour beyond the confines of a group or association, social 
capital can contribute to a restriction of reciprocity and trust and lead to an 
increase in opportunism and distrust outside the respective groups. Social capi-
tal can lack positive spill-over effects because it only promotes commitment to 
the “club” good of a group rather than to the public good of the society as a 
whole.14 Emotional commitment internally to a group can be combined with 
antipathy towards outsiders and trust could remain particularistic and only 
encompass the members of one’s own group. Clusters of this kind will more 
likely embody “bonding” than “bridging“ social capital and be networks in 
which the internal strong ties are fostered by the homogeneity of their mem-
bers. From this “black”, negative list results a “white”, positive list with those 
attributes which prima facie can contribute to a spill-over of the social capital 
of specific groups and communities that is valuable to the society at large.15 
Thus it is decisive that social networks are not exclusive resources and instru-
ments of separation by which artificial borders are erected against goods and 
services. The different clusters must instead be embedded in a comprehensive 
network by which “bridges” are built between the different groups thereby 
unfolding a potential of inclusion.16  
We can conclude that the relation between the formal institutions of a po-
litical and legal order and the informal social institutions which create the 
social capital of a society is more complex and differentiated than it may ap-
                                                     
14 See Stolle (1998). 
15 See Stolle/Rochon (1998); Warren (2001); Paxton (2002). 
16 Baurmann (2006); (2008); Granovetter (1973). 
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pear at first sight: social institutions can support state institutions in motivat-
ing people to behave in ways that are conducive to the stability and flexibility 
of the formal institutions of a society – this was the main focus of early social 
capital theory. But social institutions can also erode state institutions in moti-
vating people to behave contrary to the rules and laws that are enacted by po-
litical and legal organs. Social institutions can compete with state institutions 
by creating social relationships and social norms as alternatives to the existing 
laws and institutions. And social institutions can substitute state institutions if 
state institutions are defective or too weak to enforce a political or legal order. 
We would like to discuss this more complicated picture by means of a con-
crete and highly interesting example: the example of China and its social, po-
litical and economic history over the last 40 years. 
Guanxi as the Chinese Social Capital  
After the Cultural Revolution the Chinese people found themselves in a dread-
ful situation and realized that they could not count on the Communist state for 
a better life. They then began to revive the resources of traditional social insti-
tutions in China which are based on personal networks and emotional bonds. 
Such relationships are defined as guanxi. The influential Chinese anthropolo-
gist, Fei Xiaotong, characterizes guanxi as a “differential mode of association” 
which he illustrates with the image of “concentric circles formed when a stone 
is thrown into a lake”.17 The closer persons are to the actor in the centre, the 
more easily the actor will trust them and treat them preferentially. But unlike 
familism or other particularistic relationships which are firmly embedded in 
kinship, affinity or geographical origin, guanxi is an open and flexible institu-
tion. Under market conditions it is a rule that the wider one’s social network 
is, the easier it is to get access to profitable economic transactions.  
For this reason the Chinese exploit every chance to extend guanxi in various 
ways: social occasions such as birthdays, weddings or funerals are taken as op-
portunities to enhance existing guanxi relations. Mutual friends function as 
“trust intermediaries” and form bridges to new guanxi partners. Simultaneous-
ly the Chinese nowadays are ready to turn away from persons who have earned 
                                                     
17 Fei (1992), 63. 
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a bad reputation even when they are genetically or geographically close. So it is 
still accurate to state that in the networks of guanxi people are treated particu-
laristically in regard to their position in “the differential mode of association”. 
But these networks can expand dynamically and the position of people in them 
can change depending on their compliance to the rules of guanxi. 
Some scholars consider guanxi as a kind of instrumental relationship which 
depends mainly on mutual material interests.18 But it is an essential feature of 
guanxi that its instrumental functionality is inseparably linked with its expres-
sive components, especially renqing (personal feeling) and mianzi (face).19 It is 
an efficient strategy in China to utilize the rules of renqing and mianzi as ways 
and means of influence and manipulation, especially when people with few 
economic and political resources try to fraternize with people of a higher social 
rank. This strategy is successful because no matter how economically wealthy 
or politically powerful certain persons are, they have to be responsive to the 
requests from their friends and partners in order to maintain renqing and mi-
anzi. The instrumental value of guanxi depends on the fact that Chinese people 
are willing to invest economic and political resources in the maintenance of 
guanxi not only for the material profit of long lasting cooperation, but also out 
of moral commitment and for nurturing a favorable personal reputation. 
Therefore, instead of being either an instrumental or an expressive social rela-
tion guanxi should be understood as a “mixed tie” of instrumentality and ex-
pressivity.  
It is widely accepted that in China guanxi is the most valuable social capi-
tal in everyday life.20 However, it is quite controversial which effect guanxi has 
at a wider societal level. According to Max Weber,21 the inward feature of 
Chinese social networks erects borders and barriers between groups rather than 
bridging them. And this is why a modern market economy could not be born 
in China. Contemporary social scientists such as Fukuyama hold the same 
                                                     
18 See Sun (1996). 
19 Reqing refers to the expressive feelings between interacting individuals, e.g. empa-
thy. Mianzi refers to personal dignity and reputation. One can lose mianzi by either 
refusing to do a favour for friends or being refused by friends. More information of 
renqing and mianzi see Hwang 1987. 
20 See Yang (1994). 
21 Weber (1968). 
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opinion. He argues that guanxi is responsible for the small scale of business 
and the widespread corruption in public sectors in China.22 From this perspec-
tive guanxi actually destroys the foundation of a well-functioning society and 
its institutions instead of promoting it.  
However, the development of China in the last 30 years tells a much more 
differentiated story. The Chinese economy has been growing at an average of 
almost 10 % since the beginning of the economic reforms in 1978 – three 
times the global average. It is hard to believe that a society with a serious 
shortage of mutual trust and limited skills of cooperation is capable of achiev-
ing such an astounding success. For this reason some scholars admit that guan-
xi actually contributes to the efficiency of economic transactions in China.23 
Moreover, the extremely adverse political and legal environment at the begin-
ning of the reforms24 suggests that the boom of the Chinese private economy in 
the 1980s is to a great extent to be attributed to social factors – more specifi-
cally, to the social institution of guanxi rather than to political and legal insti-
tutions of the state. 
Therefore, instead of assigning guanxi exclusively and statically to the 
“black” or “white” list of social capital, we will analyze its development as an 
adaptation to a dynamic social and institutional framework. Guanxi is not a 
static institution and its role as social capital has undergone significant chang-
es during the last decades of Chinese history. Especially its relation to the po-
litical and legal institutions has altered significantly and developed from an 
institution that promoted the establishment of an efficient market economy in 
confrontation with the political system to an institution that strengthens cor-
rupt relations between entrepreneurs and state officials and weakens economic 
productivity. This historical clue will help us to gain a better understanding of 
guanxi as social capital and its complex interdependencies with the political 
and legal institutions in China.  
                                                     
22 Fukuyama (1995a), Fukuyama (1995b). 
23 See Wong/Chan (1999); Wong/Leung (2001); Yeung/Tung (1996). 
24 In the 1980s there was not only no formal protection of private property rights, but 
the Communist Party of China (CCP) also imposed extensive restrictions on the pri-
vate sector. Any economic activity crossing these lines would be punished in the 
name of “speculation”. We will discuss this later in this paper. 
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Evolving the Chinese Market Economy 
According to theories in the tradition of institutional economics well-defined 
property rights are the prerequisite of a flourishing market economy. In a soci-
ety without an effective legal order and enforceable rules everybody is involved 
in “the war of all against all” and thus any form of efficient economic exchange 
is hampered. The exit option from such a “Hobbesian jungle” is to establish 
powerful state institutions that can guarantee a stable order of cooperation. 
Seen from this perspective, the economic performance of a society depends 
vitally on the efficacy of coercive instruments of the state in protecting private 
property and punishing those who disobey the laws. Douglass North conse-
quently assumes that the rise of the Western World would not have been pos-
sible without its efficient institutional protection of private property.25  
However, the growth of the Chinese private economy is quite different 
from its western counterparts. At the beginning of the economic reform in the 
1970s the CPC (Communist Party of China) decided to shift its focus from 
political campaign to centrally administered economic development. State-
owned enterprises were the main concern and as at that time the Party had no 
intention of encouraging private enterprises or a market economy in general. 
Consequently, during the 1970s and 1980s no laws were enacted in order to 
protect market contracts or private property. If Chinese citizens wanted to 
conduct private transactions at that time, they had to act in a “Hobbesian jun-
gle” where opportunist behaviour or the breach of contracts was not prevented 
or punished by formal institutions.  
But not only “predation” in the “Hobbesian jungle” threatened the first 
generation of Chinese entrepreneurs. There was also discrimination and perse-
cution by state organs – the “Leviathan”. Heavy tax was imposed on private 
enterprises and time-consuming bureaucratic procedures had to be followed. 
Private entrepreneurs were not allowed to employ more than seven employees 
before 1987 and, in addition, their economic activities were discreetly con-
trolled by the authority. Any private transactions not complying with these 
prescriptions would be punished as “crimes of speculation”, a kind of crime 
that was codified in 1979 and eliminated only in 1997. According to the study 
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by Xiaobo Wu26 around 30,000 people were convicted of the crime of specula-
tion in 1982, most of whom were successful private entrepreneurs. Obviously, 
the original purpose of the Party was to protect the state-owned and collective 
economy from competition in the market. The fact that the private economy 
finally grew “out of the plan” (see Naughton 1995) was unexpected and un-
wanted. 
Therefore, rebutting conventional wisdom, the legal institutionalization of 
private property followed the growth of the private economy in China, not the 
other way round.27 In order to understand the Chinese economic “miracle”, it 
is necessary to focus on the social institutions that made private economic ac-
tivity and the development of markets possible without legal authorization and 
a formal protection of property rights. 
The greatest challenge to the first generation of Chinese entrepreneurs was 
to protect private property from the threat of “Leviathan”, namely from the 
Communist state and its jurisdiction. Hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs 
were doing business “illegally” at risk of imprisonment. In view of this diffi-
cult situation, Chinese entrepreneurs came up with organizational innovations 
to feign collective ownership which could save them from prosecution by the 
state. The two most important innovations were shareholding corporatives and 
“red hat” enterprises. In a shareholding corporative several families joined to-
gether to run a business. All the family members were owners as well as the 
employees of the corporative. A “red hat” enterprise was a private enterprise 
that was registered as a collective one. Nominally these enterprises belonged to 
the local governments but were actually under the control and part of the “in-
formal” property of individuals. In both cases the enterprises founded by pri-
vate citizens were disguised as being in collective ownership. 
That does not mean that faked collective ownership was without dangers 
and risks. As a new form of economic organization, a shareholding corporative 
was not clearly defined as a collective enterprise by the central authority until 
1990. Thus its survival and development relied mainly on the local policies of 
the cadres on-site. In the same way “red hat” enterprises were neither clearly 
encouraged nor forbidden by the CPC, leaving the local governments plenty of 
room for dealing with this novel form of economic business at their own dis-
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cretion. As Donald Clarke remarks, local party officials and bureaucrats could 
easily regain the actual control over these enterprises by changing their poli-
cies. The private owners of the enterprises would be demoted “to mere em-
ployees with no right to a return on the capital that they had invested”.28 
However, local cadres normally did not exploit the situation for their private 
gains but instead protected and encouraged these institutional inventions in 
many areas from below. Because of this support from local governments, 
shareholding corporative and “red hat” enterprises became very successful and 
popular all over the country in the 1980s. More remarkably, they contributed a 
great part to the national economic growth although the policies of the central 
government in that period were extremely unstable and unpredictable.29  
Why were the local cadres in fact willing to help private entrepreneurs de-
spite their extremely dominant position in relation to these entrepreneurs? The 
crucial factor was their joint embeddedness in the social institution of guanxi 
and their subjection to the same social forces created by this institution. Un-
like economic or political power, the social power of guanxi is generated by 
personal interactions in everyday life. It is a binding social obligation for Chi-
nese to maintain affective and reliable relationships with their relatives, friends 
and partners via regular gift-giving and invitations to banquets. Through these 
frequent exchanges and their contribution to stable interpersonal ties and re-
ciprocal commitments an effective social power is created which can trump 
political and economic power. Especially in smaller towns and villages this 
power can be particularly strong because people are closely connected through 
kin, marriage and long-lasting personal acquaintance.  
Therefore, in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution rural cadres found it 
more and more difficult to maintain and make use of their formal power. They 
were integrated in the social institutions of their communities and social pres-
sure caused them to accept bargains and compromises with villagers who were 
their relatives and friends. When state policies came into direct conflict with 
the interests of the communities, the cadres usually chose to protect the inter-
ests of local people by deceiving the state officials. Observing this phenomenon 
Yun-xiang Yan concludes: “the new pattern of political behavior among the 
rural cadres might create an informal mechanism to counterbalance and resist 
                                                     
28 Clarke (1991), 305. 
29 See Nee/Opper (2012); Tsai (2007); Whiting (2006). 
292 
state control of society and the negative effects of central policy”.30 Similarly, 
Yusheng Peng (2004) found a solid and positive correlation between the soli-
darity of kinship and the prosperity of private economy in Chinese villages: the 
more closely villagers are socially connected to each other, the more likely local 
cadres submit to the social norms of guanxi and the better the local economy 
develops. The fact that local cadres in rural areas are particularly committed to 
their fellow-citizens due to the strength of social networks in these areas can 
partly explain why in the early 1980s private entrepreneurship was developing 
most vibrantly in the poorest and most rural regions of China.31 
In dealing with local cadres Chinese entrepreneurs successfully utilized the 
norms and rules of guanxi. For example, instead of offering direct bribes, pri-
vate entrepreneurs tried to produce or intensify emotional bonds between the 
cadres and themselves via gift-giving and invitations to banquets, which gave 
rise to obligations and indebtedness. The skills and techniques of creating 
genuine guanxi relationships are known in China as guanxixue (guanxi studies) 
which refers to the capability of establishing and manipulating guanxi for 
one’s own purposes. With this capability private entrepreneurs could influence 
relevant cadres even when they had no relationship of blood and affinity. As 
Mayfair Yang observes: 
“Gift-giving creates a microcosmic world in which hierarchical relations are to a cer-
tain extent reversed. Donors become the moral superiors of recipients, who now owe 
favors to their donor. Symbolic capital compensates for the lack of material, office, or 
political capital. Thus face and the morality of reciprocity, obligation, and indebted-
ness become in a sense the ammunition of the weak. This mobilization of the forces of 
gift morality effects a subtle displacement of the potency by diversifying the state 
economy’s principle of classification and distribution by rank.”32 
From this point of view guanxi was the most powerful “weapon of the weak” 
(Scott 1985). Through a sophisticated use of this weapon officially discrimi-
nated private entrepreneurs successfully created a “microcosmos” in which they 
could counter the political power of the central authority as well as avoid the 
possible economic extortion by the local governments. Guanxi helped them to 
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create a small safe environment in an unfriendly political and legal institution-
al framework and to achieve a thriving private economy in China. 
In a similar way the “microcosmos” of guanxi also helped the first genera-
tion of Chinese entrepreneurs to deal with the second challenge they faced in 
the early years of the private economy in China, namley to secure their eco-
nomic transactions against fraud and deception by private parties without any 
legal protection. As already emphasized, if the Chinese wanted to conduct 
private transactions at this time, they had to act in a world where opportunist 
behaviour or the breach of contracts would hardly be punished by the formal 
institutions of a legal order. But the norms and rules of guanxi were not only 
strong social forces that integrated state officials in an efficient network of 
mutual trust and commitment, they also created social capital that provided a 
dense web of stable social relations in which economic exchange could success-
fully take place without the protective shield of institutionalized property 
rights and a reliable contract law. Stable interpersonal relations and reciprocal 
commitments which are created by guanxi produce binding obligations and 
affective ties between entrepreneurs and state officials but also between the 
private actors on the market in their economic transactions. 
Establishing the Chinese Market Economy 
In the 1980s the Chinese private entrepreneurs had achieved tremendous suc-
cess and changed the whole economic landscape of China. Realizing reluctantly 
that the bottom-up privatization had greatly stimulated the national economy 
despite its inconsistency with the Communist ideology, the central authority 
began to legalize the private firms and to gradually establish a market econo-
my from the end of the 1980s. For example, in 1987 the restriction of a maxi-
mum of seven employees in private firms was removed and in 1997 the crime 
of “speculation” was eliminated from criminal law. The property rights of 
private entrepreneurs were officially admitted and protected by the state au-
thority, thus rendering fake collective ownerships superfluous.33 Some scholars 
believed that guanxi would lose its importance once the formal protection of 
private property became available (Guthrie 1998). This prediction failed. De-
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spite the dramatic changes in the formal institutional environment in China, 
guanxi still plays an important role in everyday life and economic contexts.34 
Still today foreign investors are advised to learn the rules of guanxi – namely 
the rules of mianzi and renqing – if they want to build trust relationships with 
their Chinese partners (Buckley/Clegg/Tan 2006). 
The persistence of guanxi results from two facts. Firstly, although the pro-
tection of private property rights was finally added in a constitutional amend-
ment in 2004, the enforcement of formal laws in China is still weak, costly and 
unreliable. To press a charge against a person for a criminal or civil offence and 
realize a conviction is time-consuming and incalculable, especially when gov-
ernment officials are involved.35 It is more efficient and less risky to resolve 
conflicts or problems via personal networks rather than through formal proce-
dures.  
The second reason is that even in a developed market economy guanxi can 
still contribute significantly to a well-functioning and sustainable order of 
economic cooperation. It has often been argued that guanxi as a social institu-
tion is incompatible with a modern market because guanxi mechanisms are 
restricted to local networks that divide markets into small segments. These 
restrictions would prevent the advantages of an efficient division of labour and 
large companies with economies of scale would not be feasible.36 However, as 
Yang suggests, guanxi should be recognized as “a multifaceted ever-changing 
set of practices”.37 On the one hand, market relationships are structured by 
guanxi, yet on the other hand, the dynamics of markets force guanxi to evolve. 
After the successful establishment of a market economy the main challenge of 
Chinese entrepreneurs is not the intensity of guanxi but its extensity: the larg-
er and wider social networks of persons become, the more chances they will 
have at the marketplace to establish profitable and stable economic relation-
ships. Under these conditions ties of kinship and affinity alone could no longer 
satisfy private entrepreneurs who wanted to expand their business and to seize 
the opportunities a growing market offers.  
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The most practical way to enlarge one’s networks is to use the social capital 
of an existing guanxi. For example, one can establish guanxi with a stranger 
via a mutual friend. A person will trust a stranger if a mutual friend forms a 
bridge and a bond between them: all persons in this new triangle have to re-
spect the mianzi of each other because humiliating the new acquaintance – e.g. 
by refusing a request – will also hurt the old friend and if one owes a renqing-
favor of his or her friend, he or she will usually feel responsible for the newly 
introduced stranger. In this way trust and commitment can be transferred by 
intermediaries from one relationship to another. Mianzi and renqing function 
as universal media which can flow from hand to hand thereby creating wide-
spread and inclusive social and economic networks.  
Therefore, even in a modern market economy guanxi as a social institution 
is effective in promoting the social virtues of cooperation and trustworthiness 
and thereby reducing the costs and risks of economic exchanges and promoting 
the overall functionality of a market. Some scholars thus assume that guanxi-
mediated market processes are to be seen as a genuine alternative to the west-
ern market system. Moreover, with regard to low transaction costs and strong 
commitment guanxi may be even more efficient than the western style market 
mechanisms.38  
Given the ongoing weakness of legal institutions and the high degree of 
adaptability of guanxi to the demands of modern markets it makes sense for 
Chinese entrepreneurs to stick to the traditional social institutions when look-
ing for security and protection of their interests. The more entrepreneurs try to 
solve problems via personal ties, the more refined their skills of guanxi be-
come. And the greater the resources of guanxi which are accumulated, the 
more reluctant they will be to resort to formal procedures. In this way the 
social institution guanxi has managed successfully to substitute suboptimal 
and defective formal institutions and fulfil functions that from a standard 
point of view are the exclusive responsibility of state organs. 
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Undermining the Chinese Market Economy 
However, guanxi has also revealed dark sides as social capital. In supporting 
economic transactions it strengthens social virtues of cooperation, facilitates 
mutual trust between exchange partners and increases the level of sociability. 
But when political agents are involved, guanxi tends to establish patron-client 
relationships which jeopardize economic efficiency by distorting market mech-
anisms and favouring preferential intervention. Actually, pursuing political 
patronage via guanxi is not a new phenomenon concomitant with the market 
economy in China. This strategy was already widely utilized in socialist facto-
ries in Mao’s era when the workers tried to build affective personal ties with 
their leaders for the sake of political, material and career advantages.39 In the 
1980s, as already described above, Chinese peasant entrepreneurs successfully 
forced local cadres to provide a “political shelter” against the state with the 
help of personal connections in clan and kinship.40 But while in Mao’s era pa-
tron-client relationships actually supported the CPC in incorporating the soci-
ety into the communist system,41 and in the 1980s stimulated the economic 
growth of the whole country by establishing competing social institutions that 
promoted the emergence of markets, patron-client relationships based on the 
guanxi culture have now become negative factors that hinder the further polit-
ical and economic development of China.  
As the institutional environment changed, political favours that were for-
merly used for securing private property or protection against state control 
came to signify new messages for the market participants: the opportunity for 
additional personal advantages that could be gained through corruption in 
politicized markets. For example, on the stock and real estate markets which 
are strictly constrained by the government, market participants are tempted to 
establish reliable guanxi with relevant cadres in order to gain more profit 
through their special protection. With the help of cadres one can acquire a 
personal fortune by buying personal stocks with public funds or renting land 
at extremely low costs.42 The seductive prospects of realizing huge profits by 
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the circumvention of market mechanisms motivate many Chinese entrepre-
neurs to invest in the competition for political power instead of in the compe-
tition for customers thereby destroying the most important foundation of the 
“wealth of nations”.  
Obviously, in this “power game”43 only a small fraction of the participants 
can win, while most of them will lose. But, as Chenting Su and James Little-
field observe, “even though power is quite scarce in today's China, the popu-
lace is still actively having a hand in carving up monopolized interests by 
means of their specific qinyou44 guanxi web”.45 Why are the Chinese still 
clinging to such ineffective competition even though the overall return from 
this form of guanxi is dramatically decreasing? The reason is the social embed-
dedness of corruption. Even though the purposes and consequences of patron-
client relationships in China have changed, renqing and mianzi are still the 
most important norms of these relations. Thus, political power in China is not 
arbitrarily abused but distributed according to the rules of guanxi. This means 
that the relation between entrepreneurs and cadres is not simply an exchange 
of money and favors. One famous example is Lai Changxin, the central figure 
in an enormous corruption scandal that exploded in the Chinese city of Xia-
men in 1998. Having started from a lower social class Lai successfully built 
guanxi connections with dozens of local cadres. With their help he quickly 
became the most powerful and wealthy man in Xiamen by smuggling luxury 
cars and entire tanker-loads of oil into China. Mark Granovetter, inspired by 
the story of Lai, comments:  
“Elaborate systems of gift giving, banquets, entertainment, and favors keyed to the 
highly particular needs of officials are developed. Whereas a cash payment to the offi-
cial would be considered an insult, the banquets and special favors can be thought of as 
a form of deference, which the higher-status person can imagine is owed to him.”46 
The social embeddedness of corruption has two effects. Firstly, the role of 
guanxi in patron-client relationships provides chances even for those people 
who come from lower classes. As the story of Lai tells, access to higher-ranking 
cadres is not exclusive to social elites. Anyone who acquires sufficient skills of 
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guanxi has the chance to improve his or her social status. Because of the wide 
range of social networks, most Chinese can establish guanxi even with high 
profile cadres via intermediaries. Secondly, guanxi restrains cadres from abus-
ing their political power ad libitum. Cadres do not only value financial returns 
but also their personal reputation in the relevant social networks. They like to 
think that they are not actually bribed but simply receive gifts from friends 
and returned favours. Because of these social and moral constraints, the behav-
iour of cadres in China is predictable and maneuverable which is different from 
the corruption in Africa where officials exploit their power arbitrarily and 
without scruples.47  
Therefore, even though most Chinese acknowledge the notorious deficiency 
of their political and legal institutions, they are quite confident that they have 
sufficient skills and capacities to utilize their guanxi resources and take ad-
vantage of the deficient political system to secure their personal interests (see 
Sun 1996, 30). In this way guanxi not only undermines the mechanisms of a 
market economy but also discourages people from demanding further institu-
tional development. This is one reason why, contradictory to the prognoses of 
many scholars,48 China has failed to evolve into a democratic society after its 
astounding economic achievements and instead become a “capitalism without 
democracy” (Tsai 2007). 
Interdependencies between Legal and Social Institutions 
The experience of China supports social capital theory in its central claim that 
political and legal institutions are not the only forces that affect the trajectory 
of societal development but that social institutions like guanxi have a strong 
impact on the dynamics of a society and the performance of the formal state 
institutions. However, the Chinese case also makes clear that the relation be-
tween the formal institutions of the state and the informal institutions of social 
capital are complex and diverse. As we have seen, social norms that are en-
forced by guanxi relationships in everyday life can neutralize the economic and 
political advantages of the ruling powers and provide ordinary citizens with 
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opportunities to initiate a progressive development of the economic system. 
However, the same social institution can in other contexts discourage the po-
tential challengers of a political order and undermine economic efficiency and 
progress. 
To achieve a more differentiated picture of the possible relations between 
formal state institutions and informal social institutions it is helpful to adapt a 
fourfold table proposed by Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky.49 They sug-
gest using two dimensions: whether a social institution is convergent or diver-
gent in relation to state institutions which are, in turn, divided into effective 
and ineffective institutions with respect to their more or less successful en-
forcement: 
Table 4: Interdependencies between Legal and Social Institutions 










Source: Helmke/Levitsky (2004), 728 (slightly changed) 
This typology can enhance our analysis of institutional development. We can 
recapitulate the institutional evolution in China with its ongoing changes 
between formal and informal institutions by using this table with the different 
outcomes it signifies. 
In Mao’s era (1949–1976) the most important formal institution in China 
was the Communist political system whose rules and norms were strictly en-
forced. Many Chinese people were convinced that the CPC would establish a 
wealthy communist society. Social institutions like universalistic comradeship 
were promoted and widely accepted for the purpose of the realization of a 
Communist society. In the spirit of comradeship study groups were established 
for studying and spreading Marxist-Leninist theory and the thoughts of Mao 
Zedong, and “revolution groups” were established for promoting the class 
campaigns. These social institutions were convergent with effective state insti-
                                                     
49 Helmke/Levitsky (2004). 
300 
tutions and supported the CPC in reshaping China into a Communist state. 
They later developed into the radical political movement of the Cultural Revo-
lution. 
After the disastrous economic failure of the Communist system the Chinese 
became tired of political movements and sceptical about the economic pro-
spects of a centrally planned command economy. Chinese people started to 
revitalize traditional social institutions and developed the social capital of 
guanxi independent of the state. As mentioned above, on the basis of this so-
cial capital private entrepreneurs invented “shareholding cooperatives” and 
“red hat enterprises” in the 1980s in order to broaden their business and avoid 
being accused of the “crime of speculation”. These practices did not openly 
contradict the laws and on the surface were compatible with the legal order. 
But they violated the “spirit” of the laws and the original intention of the CPC 
which at the beginning of the reform tried to restrict the development of a 
private economy. Eventually the people managed to establish informal proper-
ty rights on the basis of a working social institution that successfully confront-
ed the state institutions. With the help of guanxi, divergent social institutions 
were established that started to undermine and erode the state control of the 
economy. 
After the market economy was finally introduced as the fundament of the 
national economy, laws were enacted for the protection of private property and 
the enforcement of contracts. However, guanxi was not completely replaced by 
formal rules and institutions because of their weak and uncertain enforcement. 
Chinese entrepreneurs therefore still use guanxi to ensure economic transac-
tions and create stable business relations. Guanxi is a convergent social institu-
tion in this case because it is compatible with formal rules and procedures but 
also a substitute for state institutions which are not effective enough to create a 
sufficiently stable environment for economic actions.  
What we see now, however, is the transformation of guanxi into a new form 
of divergent and competing social institution. In the 1980s guanxi relations 
with political cadres were used to gradually establish a market economy and 
thereby promote economic efficiency. Today guanxi networks in the political 
realm are used more and more as instruments for rent-seeking and receiving 
privileges, to circumvent market competition or evade legal prescriptions. This 
development endangers economic productivity and undermines the efficiency 
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of market mechanisms – just the contrary effect guanxi had in the era of the 
development of a market economy in China.  
Many social scientists acknowledge that a gradual process of reform is the 
secret of China’s success.50 At the beginning Chinese entrepreneurs tried to 
circumvent formal rules that restricted private economic activity. They revital-
ized and renewed the social institutions of guanxi for this purpose. These social 
institutions successfully eroded the Communist economic order and managed 
to compete directly with the political and legal institutions as the state’s power 
waned. Finally, the relevant laws were changed in acknowledgment of the 
factual developments. In this way the radical institutional changes in China 
were realized piece by piece through the institutional inventions from below 
and the official recognition from above. Thus, bottom-up initiative, experi-
mentation, learning, and adaptation form the core of the institutional changes 
in China.  
However, this is not the whole story and not the only lesson Chinese histo-
ry taught us about the relationship between formal state institutions and in-
formal social institutions. The chain of causes must be analysed not only from 
social capital to legal and political institutions but also vice versa. If our analy-
sis is correct and the dark side of guanxi as social capital is gaining momentum 
in China as an effective instrument of socially embedded corruption then this 
development must be combatted by enforcing an efficient rule of law.  
As we said at the outset, the overall state of a society is always an equilibri-
um between the forces of formal and informal institutions. But if a society is in 
the grip of the dark sides of social institutions, a new and improved equilibri-
um cannot be initiated without the intervention of the legal and political insti-
tutions of the state – which is especially challenging if these institutions are 
not supported by convergent social institutions: that is the message from social 
capital theory that remains valid. 
Insofar it is not surprising that China has failed to stimulate a new round of 
effective political and legal reforms up to now. Public authorities are often 
compromised via guanxi and most Chinese still believe that they can take ad-
vantage of the status quo using their guanxi skills and resources. Further insti-
tutional reforms will not happen before most Chinese realize that only a small 
amount of players can win in the “power game” but that all could benefit from 
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a firm rule of law. At this point one must hope that social capital will enter the 
stage once again in its heroic role and that Chinese citizens will create a social 
force to influence state policies to the better. Because of the strict control of 
the government, there are few civil organizations similar to such associations in 
Western democracies, but citizens in China are as always connected via person-
al ties and social networks in their guanxi relations. Maybe guanxi will again 
demonstrate its flexibility and adaptability and acquire a new meaning in 
shaping the social fabric of an independent civic realm in which the interests 
and preferences of citizens are formed and articulated. In this way a civil socie-
ty of its own kind may be realized in China, different in its foundation and 
profile from Western society but perhaps as powerful and beneficial as it was 
during the realization of a market economy in the face of counteracting politi-
cal forces. 
Conclusion 
We started our paper with a theoretical discussion of social capital. In order to 
gain a more complex and appropriate understanding of social capital and its 
dimensions and impacts, we referred to the Chinese experience of the last 40 
years. The tremendous success China has achieved as well as the huge challeng-
es it now faces could in great part be attributed to Chinese-style social capital: 
guanxi, which exerts both a positive and negative influence on the transition of 
Chinese society. We learn from this study that first, social capital cannot be 
viewed simply as an exclusively benign social resource, second, that the societal 
impact of social capital not only depends on its own features but also on its 
economic and political context, and, finally, that a promising and underex-
posed field of research lies in the dynamic interaction between formal institu-
tions such as the rule of law and social capital as a social institution: how they 
conflict, coexist and adapt to each other. Insight into this process may improve 
our understanding of institutional change and the determining factors of its 
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